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Tackling corporate tax avoidance: The case for the EU Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
 
Jamie Morgan  
 
Now Jonah’s Captain, shipmates, was one whose discernment detects crime in any, but whose 
cupidity exposes it only in the penniless. In this world shipmates, sin that pays its way can travel 
freely, and without a passport; whereas Virtue, if a pauper, is stopped at all frontiers. (Melville, 
2013: p. 52) 
 





Concepts of populism define it awkwardly as a form of complex collective 
simplification of the world in terms of causes, consequences and solutions to 
problems that are in some sense real but reduced or misrepresented.1 Populist 
simplicity is a profound contemporary problem. It is intrinsic to current debates 
regarding the future of the European Union (EU), as well as the significance of 
Brexit and the election of Donald Trump (see Morgan, 2017; Fullbrook and 
Morgan, 2017). Crises of legitimacy are occurring at all scales of government and 
governance. Corporation tax policy is an important, but often neglected, aspect of 
contemporary problems of international politics. People tend to be aware that it 
is an issue of concern, one that provokes strong feelings regarding justice, but 
the issue is often considered too technical. It typically sits as one aspect of the 
dark side of globalization as an example of how the world enables corporations 
to act with impunity. At the same time, few beyond expert activist networks and 
policy communities are aware that solutions exist and that progress is possible. 
This is important because tax policy can either be part of problems of legitimacy 
or part of solutions. It can be centrifugal or centripetal. This is particularly the 
case for corporation tax.  
Corporate tax avoidance by multinationals continues to be a source of 
public concern (Morgan, 2016b; Morgan and Sun, 2017). Multinationals have 
proven adept at structuring their organization to pay little or no tax. Every few 
months the popular press report another scandal involving some of the world’s 
most prominent companies (Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, McDonalds and many 
others). States have increasingly articulated their opposition to tax avoidance 
and their commitment to address it via the G7, G20, OECD, EU and UN. Yet tax 
avoidance has two sides, the activity of firms and the opportunities created or 
not closed by states. This occurs within a system. In the following paper I set out 
                                                        
 Thanks to Sol Picciotto, David Quentin and Prem Sikka for generous provision of their work. 
Thanks also to participants at the Global Wealth Chain workshop organized by Leonard 
Seabrooke and Duncan Wigan and hosted by Ronen Palan at CityPERC (Political Economy 
Research Centre) City University London, February 2017.  
1 This should not be conflated with dehumanization. Those who are seduced by populism are not 
idiots, though the collective response may be idiotic. For example, many who voted for Trump 
were highly reflexive regarding their choices and quite aware of the risks involved. They were 
not ignorant of who they were voting for though given the lack of policy clarity they were by 
definition ignorant of precisely what they were voting for.  
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some of the key aspects of tax avoidance in order to make the point that there 
are limits to reform within the current system. There is a case for a more 
transformative approach to the problem of corporate tax avoidance based on 
unitary taxation by formula apportionment. The European Union (EU) already 
has a version of unitary taxation that members could adopt: the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). The CCCTB represents an 
opportunity to address one of the major abuses of our time. It has long run 
collective benefits. However, the CCCTB is an intervention into an already 
existing system. Its adoption requires EU members to move beyond current 
embedded and divisive interests. Moreover, the case for the CCCTB involves 
more than technical matters, an economic argument and a change in formal 
rules. It involves a change in what we mean by an economic argument and a 
change in attitudes to rules. These are ethical or normative issues of fairness. 
They are intrinsic to issues of legitimacy and so also intrinsic to problems of 
contemporary international politics. The CCCTB has the potential to be 
legitimacy enhancing. 
  
The problem of corporate tax avoidance 
 
Strictly speaking there is no such thing as a multinational corporation (MNC). 
They are more accurately multinational enterprises (MNEs). The term MNC 
conceals a basic distinction between an economic whole and a territorial-legal 
unit (Picciotto, 2011, 2012). MNEs are typically ‘firms’. In public discourse they 
are referred to by their standard trading name, Barclays or Amazon or Google. 
We recognize them as unified organizations. We understand they are strategic 
wholes subject to a directing will. However, they decompose into many 
subsidiaries, affiliates, and separate corporations located in many jurisdictions. 
Transactions between entities are intra-firm but inter-corporation. This creates 
a potential for abuse.   
Entities can have separate legal existence. At the same time, one 
corporation can be the directing influence over another. As a legal person a 
corporation can own the equity, assets, and debt of other entities. It can own the 
intellectual property that underpins the business activity of those other entities. 
There may be good business reasons for an MNE to have multiple locations and 
thus many entities. However, the capacity to create such entities encourages 
MNEs to locate them to exploit differences in tax rates, differences in tax law, 
weaknesses and loopholes in tax treaties, and differences in the way states are 
willing to treat the particular MNE.2 This is a form of arbitrage activity. The 
result is tax avoidance. Avoidance is the use of the law/regulation to adversely 
reduce tax. The specific way this is done is open to challenge from tax 
authorities, but the activity is distinguished from evasion, which is simple illegal 
non-payment of owed tax (for nuance see Quentin, 2014).    
The key point is that MNEs can locate entities in no or low tax 
jurisdictions and then use various strategies to direct or concentrate the 
reporting of income or profit in those locations (see Kleinbard, 2011). There can, 
therefore, be significant differences between where actual economic or business 
                                                        
2 Most significant entities for tax purposes are termed permanent establishments (they have a 
physical base and have been present for at least 6 months). This concept is increasingly 
anachronistic given the capacity of firms to operate effectively without continuous presence. 
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activity takes place and where income ultimately ends up being reported. States 
are not innocent in this context, but do face conflicts of interest. They have 
individual interests in attracting the reporting of income. They also have an 
interest in accommodating MNEs via tax policy, since they hope to attract real 
investment and employment as well as reporting. At the same time, individual 
states have a vested interest in protecting their tax base and in ensuring taxes 
are collected. They must also consider the popular politics of taxation. A tax 
system can be perceived as more or less legitimate. Governments are perpetually 
aware of this, especially at times when public spending is being cut and the 
media is reporting egregious examples of corporate tax practices. However, the 
underlying problem remains MNEs can engage in tax arbitrage between states 
and states can and manifestly do engage in tax-related ‘competition’. The current 
context is inherently problematic for legitimacy.  
It is important to note that the current capacity for arbitrage and 
competition is a systemic problem that has evolved over the last century 
(Picciotto, 1992, 2011). The basic constituents of international taxation emerged 
during a previous era of globalization. In the early twentieth century, the flow of 
physical goods dominated trade. In a Fordist system manufacturing MNEs 
tended to reproduce their production and administration systems in strategic 
localities.  The major tax issue of the time was that both the country of origin of 
an MNE and the locations in which it operated might find themselves taxing the 
same income. The problem to be solved through international tax treaties and 
regulation was double taxation. However, we now live in a differently globalized 
neoliberal and digital age. Services are now a large proportion of trade. A great 
deal of activity occurs through the Internet, creating scope for deliberate 
ambiguity regarding where activity occurs. Branding and intellectual property 
are now routinely separated from actual production, as is administration. Based 
on new technology, administration can be networked and distanced. Information 
technologies also mean that constructing and managing complex structures of 
entities has become both feasible and affordable. Highly specialised financial, tax, 
and consultancy services have also developed to facilitate this process. These too 
are MNEs; specialised units within the universal banks and the accountancy ‘Big 
4’ of Deloitte & Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG and Ernst & Young 
(Sikka, 2015).  
Opaque complex structures are now the norm for MNEs (Bryan et al, 
2016). For example, in 2014 BP was reported to have 1180 affiliates in 84 
countries in a twelve-tier structure (Palan and Mangraviti, 2016). In 2011, HSBC 
and Barclays were reported to control 940 subsidiaries in tax havens alone, 
including the provision of tax efficiency services to clients (Murphy & Nehru, 
2013). The problem is no longer one of double taxation but rather the potential 
for double non-taxation. MNEs are able to structure their affairs so that little or 
no tax is paid anywhere. Revenue is routed through complex networks of entities 
and held ‘offshore’ and may benefit from offsets through debt structures along 
the way. ‘Offshore’ is a slightly misleading term in two ways. First the localities 
need not be geographically remote, merely specialised as jurisdictions, such as 
Delaware. Second, well-known offshore or international finance centres, referred 
to by critics as tax havens or secrecy jurisdictions, are destinations the efficacy of 
which require the complicity of many parties, including the main financial 
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centres and many states. Their operation is an ordinary part of global business 
activity (Shaxson, 2011; Palan et al, 2010).      
The contemporary international tax system is a combination of 
institutional arrangements of individual states and regional blocs and a 
patchwork of bilateral treaties based on the OECD model treaty. The OECD 
convention is now in its ninth iteration. The underlying framework takes as its 
point of departure the separate legal entities of an MNE. The primary focus is 
‘transfer pricing’, which is the allocation of values between entities within an 
organization. The transactions between entities are assessed to establish 
whether they occur at a recognizable market price. This is termed the ‘arm’s 
length principle’ (Article 9 of the OECD model convention). The rationale for this 
is that a market price supposedly indicates that transfer pricing is not being used 
to advantageously shift where income is being reported. It is implicitly fair. 
There are currently five accepted methods of assessment for transfer pricing 
(OECD, 2010).3 Concomitantly, tax authorities investigate whether specific 
arrangements or schemes used by MNEs violate some aspect of law or 
regulation. For example, recent high profile issues have included: (1) the use of 
‘patent boxes’, which offer reduced corporation tax rates for reported income 
from intellectual property, (2) whether tax agreements (‘advanced pricing 
agreements’) between MNEs and particular states violate EU state aid rules 
(constituting unfair competition), and  (3) whether intra-organization transfers 
are genuine debts created for investment purposes (or exist notionally merely to 
offset a tax liability).4   
There are many reasons why the current system is dysfunctional. 
Transfer pricing is fundamentally inconsistent as a concept. The existence of a 
firm implies cost savings based on reduced ‘transaction costs’ within an 
organization, but the arm’s length principle assumes that a representative price 
is derived from a market interaction between separate entities. The different 
logics mean prices should not coincide. Furthermore, the application of the 
principle involves numerous practical problems. Between 60 and 70 percent of 
international trade is now intra-firm. This means it is difficult to establish a 
market reference price for many transactions. This is a problem compounded for 
many modern goods and services whose value is rooted in unique brands and 
intellectual property. Challenging the values used in transfer pricing and the 
strategies or schemes via which MNEs shift where income or profit is reported is 
necessarily a case-by-case process. It requires information, resources and time. 
There are millions of transactions and thousands of MNEs. Challenges are 
unlikely. As Sikka notes (2015), based on UK House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee hearings, the Big 4 have advised clients regarding schemes that they 
estimate have only a 50% chance of surviving legal challenge. Furthermore, the 
very nature of the system provides great scope for MNEs to contest any 
                                                        
3 For example, the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method is based on direct comparison of 
prices. The other four involve some kind of proxy calculation.   
4 The EU now monitors and provides voluntary guidelines on the use of patent boxes. Many 
members have them, including the UK and Ireland. The UK patent box introduced in 2013 allows 
a reduced rate of 10% corporation tax on reported income from the commercial exploitation of 
patents. The company can be part of a group and eligible patents from which income derives can 
be registered at any of a range of different patent offices. The EU stipulates the reduced tax must 
be directly linked to research and development activity but the reality is far more ambiguous. See 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation-tax-the-patent-box    
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challenge. The current system may formally oppose tax avoidance but is unable 
to effectively prevent it (for context see Rixen, 2008; Sharman, 2006).  
 
The consequences of tax avoidance and the limits of progress 
 
The consequences of tax avoidance are significant. Clausing provides a neat 
summary, expressing the problem in terms of base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS) effects: 
 
Recently, the OECD (2015) finds that the annual net tax revenue loss from 
tax planning is about $100 billion to $240 billion and compares its 
estimates with those of the IMF, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and 
others. A study by three IMF economists (Crivelli, Keen, and de Mooij 
(2015)) also finds that base erosion problems are large. Their short-run 
estimates indicate that OECD countries lose $207 billion in revenue (0.23 
percent of GDP) and that developing countries lose $105 billion in 
revenue (0.84 percent of GDP). Long-run estimates are $509 billion for 
OECD countries (0.6 percent of GDP) and $213 billion for developing 
countries (1.7 percent of GDP). Keightley and Stupak (2015) and Gravelle 
(2015) describe the large and increasing problem of BEPS in the United 
States and elsewhere. Indeed, the stylized facts are overwhelming in their 
confirmation of the scale of the profit-shifting problem. For U.S. 
multinational corporations, the share of income reported in foreign 
countries has been steadily increasing, and income booked in low-tax 
countries is implausibly high by any reasonable metric. As reported by 
Gravelle (2015), U.S. affiliate corporate profits were 645 percent of 
Bermuda's GDP and 547 percent of the Cayman Islands' GDP in 2004. As 
absurd as those numbers are, by 2010 they had increased to 1,614 
percent for Bermuda and 2,065 percent for the Caymans. Further, 
estimates indicate that U.S. multinational corporations have accumulated 
more than $2 trillion in permanently reinvested earnings in low-tax 
locations, more than $1 trillion of which is held in cash. (Clausing, 2016) 
 
As she notes all figures are likely underestimates, given the problem of data 
collection. Her own research puts the figure at around $280 billion per year 
globally by 2012 and she also notes that around 20% of US corporation tax may 
be avoided annually. The European Commission (EC, 2012), estimates tax 
avoidance and evasion for just the European Union at around €1 trillion per 
year. HMRC estimates annual UK tax avoidance at around £3 billion as part of a 
tax gap (tax that could be paid but is not) for 2013-14 of £35 billion. Richard 
Murphy provides a far higher estimate for the UK tax gap at £120 billion (2014).  
There has, however, been some progress. Corporate tax avoidance has 
become a high profile issue over the last 5 years and this was recognized in 2013 
by the G7 and G20, resulting in the BEPS project under the auspices of the OECD. 
BEPS has produced a series of reports, resulting in ‘Actions’ and a framework for 
monitoring, review and standard setting (first reported in 2014, and updated in 
2015 and 2016). The stated main aim has been to eliminate double non-taxation 
and ‘aggressive’ tax planning for avoidance. Significantly, participant states have 
committed to requiring MNEs to engage in country-by-country reporting of 
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revenue, profit and actual tax paid by 2017 (Action 13. OECD, 2015). In principle, 
this should provide individual tax authorities with more information to challenge 
MNEs actual tax practices. However, the International Centre for Tax and 
Development has supported a network of well-known researchers who provide a 
more critical analysis of the issues and progress of the OECD work and its 
context. As Picciotto notes, BEPS is characterised by incremental reform (2016). 
This approach tends to encourage greater participation in the process, ensuring 
some progress. At the same time, actual changes tend to be limited and carry 
with them the underlying problem that is built into the system.  
The underlying problem is that treating the different components of an 
MNE as separate entities encourages firms to channel reporting of income to 
entities located in low or no tax jurisdictions, and encourages states to compete 
as locations for reporting. This is irrespective of other interests they may have 
and the rhetoric they may espouse. The OECD BEPS reports recognize that firms 
should be ‘taxed where economic activities occur and value is created’ (OECD, 
2013a). At the same time, the reports recommend that a transfer pricing 
approach remains basic and that any new tax rules respect the sovereignty of 
states. As Palan notes (2002), many states have ‘commercialised’ their 
sovereignty. This creates tensions for any collective approach to the problem of 
tax. Ultimately, incremental reform perpetuates the systemic dynamic in which 
MNEs still have motives to engage in arbitrage. States still have motives to attract 
business through approaches to tax the very context of which are competitive in 
pathological ways, despite any commitment to the contrary. As such, it seems 
premature to claim that the problem of corporate tax avoidance is now in hand 
and tax havens’ days are numbered. There seems to be, therefore, a clear need 
for a transformative approach to policy. 
 
Apple in Ireland 
    
Consider the long running case of Ireland and Apple. This case first came to 
prominence as part of the now notorious ‘double Irish’ practice exposed by the 
US Levin Congressional Committee in 2013. Based on differences in tax status 
between the US and Ireland, Apple was able to structure key entities as tax 
resident in no jurisdiction. According to the report, Apple Operations 
International (AOI) was incorporated in Ireland. AOI as a legal person owned 
through various routes Apple’s other entities outside the US. However, though 
incorporated in Ireland it had not been managed or controlled from Ireland, but 
from the US. Based on Irish law it was not classed as tax resident. US law mainly 
taxes on the basis of location of incorporation so AOI was not classed as tax 
resident in the US either. For the purpose of taxation AOI was effectively 
‘stateless’. Apple Sales International (ASI) was also incorporated in Ireland and 
ASI owns the rights to Apple’s intellectual property outside the US. Given the 
nature of Apple’s business, significant portions of its income have been 
channelled to ASI, but little tax has been paid in Ireland. Senator McCain put the 
matter starkly in his opening statement to the US Senate Subcommittee: 
 
Although Apple is by all accounts an American company, its holding 
company in Ireland currently retains the bulk of its profits. The 
Subcommittee’s investigation has uncovered a disturbing truth. Apple’s 
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three primary Irish entities [including also Apple Operations Europe or 
AOE, which is owned by AOI] hold 60 percent of the company’s profits, 
but claim to be tax residents nowhere in the world. It is completely 
outrageous that Apple has not only dodged full payment of U.S. taxes, but 
it has managed to evade paying taxes around the world through its 
convoluted and pernicious strategies. Specifically, from 2009 to 2012, 
Apple Operations International received roughly $30 billion in dividends 
from other Apple subsidiaries around the world. That made up 30 percent 
of Apple’s total worldwide net profits over the last few years. However, 
Apple Operations International did not pay corporate income taxes to any 
national government. Furthermore, Apple Operations International, a 
company with tens of billions of dollars in cash, has never had any 
employees and appears to be completely directed by Apple in California. 
Perhaps sensing that it might need to maintain some semblance of 
legitimacy, Apple Sales International, another subsidiary with no tax 
residence and no employees through 2011, began employing 250 people 
in 2012. However, with $22 billion of income in 2011, Apple Sales 
International only paid one-twentieth of 1 percent in Irish taxes. As Apple 
funnels billions of dollars through its numerous Irish entities, even those 
entities that do pay taxes enjoy a negotiated tax rate of less than 2 
percent. Apple contends that none of its subsidiaries in Ireland reduce its 
U.S. tax liability by one cent. This statement is demonstrably false. 
(McCain in Levin 2013: p. 9)5  
 
As Levin notes: 
 
Why Ireland? Another highly successful but, until now, hidden tax 
strategy is that Apple has quietly negotiated with the Irish Government an 
income tax rate of less than 2 percent, well under the Irish statutory rate 
of 12 percent as well as the tax rates of other European countries and the 
United States, well below those statutory rates. And as we have seen, in 
practice Apple is able to pay a rate far below even that low figure [nothing 
in some cases, less than 1% for ASI]. In 2012 alone, due to the cost-
sharing agreement [a transfer pricing strategy] essentially shifting profits 
from all Apple sales outside of the Americas to Ireland, ASI received $36 
billion in income in a nation where it pays almost no income tax. (Levin, 
2013: p. 5) 
 
Ireland has committed to phasing out the double Irish by 2020. However, it has 
already put in place a ‘patent box’ system to attract the reporting of group 
income based on intellectual property. The case also led in 2013/14 to a 
European Commission investigation, led by the Competition Commissioner into 
the status of ‘negotiated’ agreements in Ireland. Reached in 1991 and 2007, 
these advanced pricing agreements (APA) act as ‘supplements’ to standard 
transfer pricing based on the OECD methods and the arm’s length principle. The 
investigation has turned on whether the 1991 and 2007 agreements (rulings) 
                                                        
5 For Apple’s rejoinder see the testimonies of Timothy Cook CEO and other Apple representatives 
in Levin, 2013 
 8 
represented an accepted and correctly applied transfer pricing methodology and 
that tax paid based on the APAs were comparable to the ‘ordinary tax system’ 
‘under market conditions’. If not then Ireland had illegitimately denied itself 
revenue and the arrangement also created a situation of unfair competition.6 In 
an initial 2014 decision the Commission stated that there were grounds to 
conclude that the arrangement did constitute state aid. Ireland was invited to 
respond. Following further lengthy investigation, the Commission eventually 
ruled 30th August 2016 that: 
 
 [T]wo tax rulings issued by Ireland to Apple have substantially and 
artificially lowered the tax paid by Apple in Ireland since 1991. The 
rulings endorsed a way to establish the taxable profits for two Irish 
incorporated companies of the Apple group (Apple Sales International 
and Apple Operations Europe), which did not correspond to economic 
reality: almost all sales profits recorded by the two companies were 
internally attributed to a "head office". The Commission's assessment 
showed that these "head offices" existed only on paper and could not have 
generated such profits. These profits allocated to the "head offices" were 
not subject to tax in any country under specific provisions of the Irish tax 
law, which are no longer in force. As a result of the allocation method 
endorsed in the tax rulings, Apple only paid an effective corporate tax rate 
that declined from 1% in 2003 to 0.005% in 2014 on the profits of Apple 
Sales International. This selective tax treatment of Apple in Ireland is 
illegal under EU state aid rules, because it gives Apple a significant 
advantage over other businesses that are subject to the same national 
taxation rules. The Commission can order recovery of illegal state aid for 
a ten-year period preceding the Commission's first request for 
information in 2013. Ireland must now recover the unpaid taxes in 
Ireland from Apple for the years 2003 to 2014 of up to €13 billion, plus 
interest. (EC, 2016a)7  
 
The US and Irish response to the EC decision are revealing. The US Treasury 
immediately responded that the EC was in effect denying the US the tax revenue 
referred to. This implies that eventually revenue would be repatriated and that 
the US had the primary call on it. There is some logic to this given that the US 
                                                        
6 The 2014 EC state aid decision clarifies the terms: “According to Article 107(1) TFEU, any aid 
granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the provision of certain 
goods shall be incompatible with the common market, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States… The main question in the present case is whether the rulings confer a selective 
advantage upon Apple in so far as it results in a lowering of its tax liability in Ireland… The Court 
of Justice has confirmed that if the method of taxation for intra-group transfers does not comply 
with the arm’s length principle, and leads to a taxable base inferior to the one which would result 
from a correct implementation of that principle, it provides a selective advantage to the company 
concerned.” (EC, 2014: p. 14-15) 
7 At the time only 6% of Apple’s pre-tax global income was allocated to jurisdictions other than 
Ireland or the US. Ireland employed 4% of Apple’s global workforce and the territory accounted 
for 1% of sales. AOI paid no corporation tax and filed no corporate income tax returns between 
2009 and 2012, although its estimated income was $30 billion. (see Seabrooke and Wigan, 2017: 
p. 16) 
 9 
Congressional investigations have maintained that the tax was merely and 
dubiously reported in Ireland and had been earned globally by a US MNE. From 
this point of view, the EC decision represents a tax grab, but only if one accepts 
the issue as a problem of double taxation, when in fact it had arisen as a problem 
of double non-taxation. The EC approach was to tackle the non-taxation within 
the bloc based on rules for state aid. Clearly, once tax arbitrage begins to take 
place the disjunctures between regions and states create grounds for conflict. 
The Irish response, articulated by its Finance Minister Michael Noonan 
was to begin a process of appeal to the European Court of Justice, rejecting its 
claim to the  €13+ billion. The response is ostensibly bizarre but has a rationale. 
According to Noonan, the decision constitutes unwarranted interference in the 
sovereign affairs of Ireland. Ireland’s economy and also its recovery from the 
financial crisis have been built on attracting capital flows from, and the 
incorporation of, MNEs. Some of this has involved real investment and 
employment, so these two and the attraction of reporting are entangled.8 Tax 
competition is integral to Ireland’s economic model. MNEs pay low tax in Ireland, 
a headline rate of 12.5%, a reality in many cases of virtually nothing. 
Concomitantly, Ireland offers an additional service via which other states are 
deprived of potential tax. Clearly, the low rate and deprivation create a mutual 
loss of revenue for all states. However, there is also an ancillary gain in Ireland 
beyond this specific loss because of other effects. If Ireland accepts the EC 
decision and collects the tax then this may well make it difficult for Ireland to 
continue to attract MNEs based on its current strategy.      
 The Apple case is not unique but it illustrates an important point.9 The 
current international tax system encourages fragmentation. It is a common 
system but not a genuinely coherent one (for context see Rixen, 2011; 
Woodward, 2006). Gradual and piecemeal reform cannot easily resolve this. One 
reason why it cannot is that the system is inherently divisive. States have a 
collective interest in ensuring tax is paid but individual motives to accommodate 
MNEs in ways that undermine the capacity of all states to tax MNEs effectively. 
The main beneficiaries of this are MNEs. When the Irish Finance Minister places 
the problem in terms of sovereignty what does this really mean? Sovereignty in 
the context of a representative democracy evokes the issue of who is 
represented and in what ways. The balance of representation seems to be 
towards the interests of MNEs rather than Irish citizens (sovereignty is 
‘commercialised’). However, given the entanglement of tax competition with real 
investment and employment the matter is not clear cut. Still, it remains the case 
that if MNEs pay little or no tax then more is paid by citizens, even if this derives 
in part from income earned at MNEs. Otherwise, public debt rises or public 
services suffer. The same public services that MNEs then rely on: infrastructure, 
a fire service, schools to educate future staff, hospitals to keep current staff 
healthy. In any case, it would be dubious to infer that citizens find it acceptable 
that MNEs are able to exercise power and influence to pay little or no tax. 
                                                        
8 Apple employs over 1,500 people in Ireland. There are more than 1,000 MNCs located in 
Ireland employing in total more than 150,000 and this constitutes the highest proportion of total 
employment in any OECD country.  
9 Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook, McDonalds, Fiat and many others have also come under 
scrutiny, as has Luxembourg and various other EU members. In July 2016 UK HMRC revealed 
that it had more than 140 APAs.      
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Acquiescence from a position of weakness is not support. Moreover, evidence 
from research on ‘tax morale’ tends to indicate perceived fairness matters to the 
legitimacy of the tax system (see OECD, 2013b).  
The very fact that MNE tax behaviour is categorized as avoidance and is 
quasi-legal undermines the public perception that contemporary democracy is 
ethically grounded. This in turn leads to toxic forms of populism and cynicism 
regarding politics in general. Tax avoidance is part of the complex of problems of 
legitimacy that regional bodies and individual states confront. Concomitantly, 
the sovereignty problem raises the issue that citizens of other states, who are 
denied tax, are not represented when decisions are made in Ireland. This is 
mirrored by likely future events in the US. Trump campaigned on an economic 
nationalist agenda, combined with tax cuts and simplifications. One aspect of this 
has been to encourage (if not coerce) corporations to repatriate capital. In the 
real context of the complexity of global tax activity, this will likely be just one 
more way in which tax competition undermines the capacity of all states to tax 
MNEs effectively.          
 A regional bloc such as the EU exists in part to reconcile inter-state 
conflicts of interest. Moreover, in theory such conflicts are what the international 
tax system and the various bilateral treaties are supposed to address. The 
intervention of the European Competition Commissioner is explicitly about what 
is fair. But this does not mean the system as is encourages fairness; the fact that 
MNEs are treated as many separate entities, subject to transfer pricing, promotes 
inequity, and sometimes iniquity.10 A case-by-case response has resource limits 
and any success simply invites innovation of current strategies of avoidance. 
Country-by-country reporting provides information to contest strategies and 
this is important, but information is not necessarily power, though it can be 
ammunition for further change. The problem is systemic. Ireland’s decision to 
reject €13+ billion in tax revenue highlights this. The decision is not irrational 
given the context, but it is perverse because of that context.    
 The EC decision also has context. Clearly, the Commissioner is aware that 
the income in Ireland has been earned across the EU and beyond. Requiring 
Ireland to collect more of it is in a sense enforcing a fiction. It is a decision to 
apply the rules that currently exist in a way that remind MNEs and Ireland that 
they cannot act with impunity. This is likely to be limited in its impact. Though it 
has spawned headlines it is a small act since both Apple and Ireland have 
appealed. Apple, conscious of negative publicity in the US have argued that more 
of the disputed tax should be owed in California, since this is where its research 
and design hub is located. In its most recent response the EC rejects this, since 
Apple’s structures give rights to intellectual property outside the US to the Irish 
entities, and it is this income based on the actual structures that is at issue (EC, 
2016b). The EC remains focused on state aid. However, the response does note 
                                                        
10 The problem is of course widely acknowledged. For example, OECD Harmful Tax Competition: 
An emerging global issue (OECD, 1998). The EC/EU has various initiatives, which attempt to 
develop a concept and tests of fair competition, as do many states. The UK’s approach is still 
underpinned by the 2001 HM Treasury/Inland Revenue document, ‘Large Business Taxation: the 
Government’s strategy and corporate tax reforms – a consultation document’, which identifies 6 
components for competitive tax: a broad base, low rate, transparency, consistency, flexibility, 
neutrality and responsiveness to market failure. ‘Fairness’ remains a difficult problem based on 
the current system (e.g. in what sense does it relate to ‘low’ and ‘market failure’).   
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that other EU members may seek to claim some of the €13+ billion if they can 
establish that sales attributed to Ireland should have been recorded in their 
locality. It seems likely that the case will drag out for years and little of the actual 
tax may eventually be collected. 
However, the case is a signal. In a curious way, it is an act on behalf of 
democracy by a relatively remote, if formally elected and selected, institution. 
Constraining MNEs is to return some potential sovereignty to all citizens of the 
EU within their member states, something that individual governments can be 
either disinclined to do or unable to do. The capacity of the EC to do this is 
perhaps an unintended consequence of the democratic deficit within EU 
institutions. This is by no means a positive argument for the perpetuation of that 
deficit given its other consequences,  not least Brexit. For example, the 
Democracy in Europe Movement addresses this.11 At the same time, the Apple 
case exposes the limits of the current approach to tax avoidance. Something 
more transformative seems to be required. In its absence corporation tax 
remains an issue liable to contribute to public cynicism and thus problems of 
legitimacy. The EC has already developed an alternative ‘unitary’ system for 
corporation tax: the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). The 
CCCTB represents a potentially transformative approach to policy. However, it is 
controversial, precisely because it is transformative, and must confront a series 
of further challenges that are more than simply technical. It is important to 
highlight these since they underscore that tax is a matter of behaviour in relation 
to context, ethics and responsibility.           
  
The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
  
The CCCTB is not new. It has been supported by the EC across a series of 
presidencies. It first emerged in an EC Communication (2001, p. 3), and was 
subsequently discussed as a ‘non-paper’ in 2003 and 2004. This resulted in the 
creation of working groups, which produced a technical outline for the CCCTB in 
2007. Dispute over the CCCTB followed and this was exacerbated by the global 
financial crisis. However, a draft EU directive was published in March 2011 and 
provisionally endorsed in March 2012 by the European Parliament (with 
proposed amendments). The CCCTB has remained under development and 
discussion since then (see conclusion). The CCCTB is a version of unitary 
taxation by formula apportionment (see Panayi, 2013, 2008). Unitary taxation 
treats the many otherwise separated entities of a MNE as a single entity for tax 
purposes. The CCCTB has four aspects: 
 
1. A set of consolidated accounts is produced for all the entities in an MNE’s 
organization. The firm is treated as a whole. However, since the CCCTB is 
an EU initiative this can only be done for EU member locations, but the 
intent is to create a common corporate tax base within the EU, which will 
then become a prototype of good practice for emulation.12 
                                                        
11https://diem25.org 
12 The CCCTB automatically requires consolidation of all subsidiaries defined in terms of parent 
company ownership of capital (75%+), profit entitlement (75%+), and voting rights (50%+). 
Importantly, the existence of intermediates in a chain that do not fulfil these criteria does not 
break the consolidation for the next in the chain (see Articles 54, 59, & 109, EC 2011a) 
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2. The consolidated accounts are reported to a designated tax authority, 
likely the home base of the MNE within the EU. 
3. The reported income/profit is then distributed to member states based 
on a formula that calculates the proportion of real economic presence of 
the MNE in each member state.13  
4. Each state then taxes the income/profit allocated to it. The actual tax rate 
applied is not set by the CCCTB but by the member state. The 2011 
directive includes no mechanism to harmonise tax rates or to impose a 
minimum.     
 
Unitary taxation by formula apportionment is transformative because it 
consolidates accounts, treating the MNE as a whole. It thus eliminates intra-
group transactions and the basic systemic problems created by separate entity 
status and the application of transfer pricing methods, subject to the arm’s 
length principle. It goes beyond a requirement for country-by-country reporting. 
Since income or profit to be taxed is allocated based on real economic presence, 
there is no advantage for the MNE in engaging in profit shifting within the EU to 





Share A refers to the individual EU member state and Group to the total for the 
organization in all member states for each of three measured factors. For reasons 
of simplicity the three factors were given equal weighting in the original 2007 
formulation and this has remained the case thereafter. Sales of goods and 
services are measured in terms of proceeds at the point of destination to 
customers/clients. This is subject to the proviso that the MNE must have a 
genuine sales point in the country of destination. This is to prevent ‘nowhere 
sales’. Nowhere sales arise where the MNE registers the sale of its goods or 
services in a locality in order to benefit from low or no tax on those sales; it 
typically does not reflect actual sales activity. For example, there is no genuine 
branch or affiliate. Where this is identified a ‘throwback rule’ applies.14 The 
employment factor is split into two sub-categories: the number of employees, 
and the value of the payroll where employees work. The value of the payroll and 
the number of employees are both significant indicators of an MNE’s presence. 
The measure defines employment as where employment is actually exercised 
                                                        
13 Note, I am using income for simplicity, the CCCTB uses the term revenue and this is subject to a 
technical definition that seeks to capture all possible ways of stating relevant income (see EC, 
2011a: Article 4(8)).  
14 According to Article 96 of the 2011 draft directive: “Sales of goods shall be included in the sales 
factor of the group member located in the Member State where dispatch or transport of the 
goods to the person acquiring them ends. If this place is not identifiable, the sales of goods shall 
be attributed to the group member located in the Member State of the last identifiable location of 
the goods.” And “If there is no group member in the Member State where goods are delivered or 
services are carried out, or if goods are delivered or services are carried out in a third country, 
the sales shall be included in the sales factor of all group members in proportion to their labour 
and asset factors.” (EC, 2011a: Article 96 (1 & 4))   
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and defines employees as those engaged in common activities. The former 
prevents potential abuses based on manipulating where the employee is 
registered as employed and where they are paid. The latter prevents 
manipulation through subcontracting portions of the workforce. To simplify the 
asset component of the calculation, assets are restricted to tangible assets. The 
intention is to provide a measure of capital investment whilst excluding financial 
assets and inventory.15 Employment and assets represent the supply side of 
income generation and sales represent the demand side (CCCTB WG, 2007: p. 
12). The greater the share of the three weighted factors in any given member 
state then the greater the share of the common tax base that is eligible for 
taxation in that state.  
Due to the common base, unitary taxation by formula apportionment 
addresses both double taxation and double non-taxation. It is an elegant solution 
to a systemic problem. However, it is not easily introduced precisely because the 
system to which it provides a solution already exists. Though the current system 
is problematic transforming it is disruptive. One reason why opposition to the 
CCCTB has arisen is that individual parties are not focussed on the long run 
collective benefits of a fully functioning form of unitary taxation. Perception is 
influenced by embedded divisive interests, corporations engaged in arbitrage 
and states engaged in competition. These must be addressed if the CCCTB is to be 
adopted. These are not purely technical matters though they may have technical 
constituents.        
  
The Single Market and the CCCTB: tensions in concepts of efficiency and 
rationality 
 
One important issue is the basic tension inherent in the contemporary 
framework of the EU. Since its inception the CCCTB has been conceived as a key 
component of the Single Market. This is first stated in the original EC 
Communication of 2001 (p. 3), it is reiterated in the technical outline of 2007 
(CCTB WG, 2007: #67, p. 16), and is fleshed out in the 2011 directive:  
      
The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) aims to tackle 
some major fiscal impediments to growth in the Single Market. In the 
absence of common corporate tax rules, the interaction of national tax 
systems often leads to over-taxation and double taxation, businesses are 
facing heavy administrative burdens and high tax compliance costs. This 
situation creates disincentives for investment in the EU and, as a result, 
runs counter to the priorities set in Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth. The CCCTB is an important initiative on 
the path towards removing obstacles to the completion of the Single 
Market and was identified in the Annual Growth Survey as a growth-
enhancing initiative to be frontloaded to stimulate growth and job 
creation. […] A key obstacle in the Single Market today involves the high 
cost of complying with transfer pricing formalities using the arm's length 
approach. Further, the way that closely integrated groups tend to 
                                                        
15 This is sub-divided into depreciable assets, whose value needs to be adjusted, and non-
depreciable assets, such as land, which are valued at cost. 
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organise themselves strongly indicates that transaction-by-transaction 
pricing based on the 'arm's length' principle may no longer be the most 
appropriate method for profit allocation. (EC, 2011a: p. 4) 
 
The key point is that one of the main ways the CCCTB has been justified is as a 
means to complete the Single Market. The idea that tax should be fair and tax 
competition should not be harmful is not ignored. However, the ‘completion’ 
argument concerns economic efficiency imperatives for MNEs, where it is 
assumed that MNEs can be encouraged to be cooperative by removing tax 
obstacles. There is a tension here. The argument assumes a more cooperative 
approach. However, many MNEs have taken, often tacitly, an oppositional stance 
-- if only by seeking to shape how and what they will cooperate with. This is 
camouflaged conflict that sometimes breaks cover, rather than cooperation. The 
CCCTB only exists because MNEs have exploited tax opportunities to engage in 
avoidance. Actual MNE behaviour and the reality of the Single Market concern 
relations of power. To address this, the transition to the CCCTB and then the 
effective functioning of it must involve more than an economic argument and a 
change in formal rules. It must involve a change in what we mean by an 
economic argument and a change in attitude to rules. It must internalise ethical 
and perhaps informal mechanisms within the CCCTB. As a mechanism it must 
also be an appropriately configured practice. The tension, must, therefore, be 
recognized and addressed rather than perpetuated, which it currently is.     
For example, the EC has produced a series of cost-benefit analyses that set 
out the potential benefits of the CCCTB for MNEs (EC, 2011b; 2011c). The models 
take the best possible assumptions regarding transaction costs, assuming that 
consolidated accounts actually reduce compliance costs, resulting in a possible 
annual reduction in such costs to existing MNEs of €700 million. The models 
then assume that reduced transaction costs actually increase the growth of firms 
across national boundaries, since the costs are a barrier to entry. This results in 
further attributed annual benefits of €1 billion. However, the assumption that 
consolidation of accounts will simply reduce transaction costs because it 
reduces, in principle, the costs of producing compliant accounts sits awkwardly 
with the existing complexity of tax behaviour and what it indicates. The 
construction of many entities in different locations, the opacity of accounts and 
the employment of tax specialists to create strategies are not accidental. Firms 
may complain about ‘red tape’ but they have not lobbied for a simpler system 
and actively worked towards simplifications of how they comply with that 
system. Tax avoidance is intentional activity, it is the creation of a legal space in 
which tax is minimised or negated.  
The cost-benefit analyses proceed on the basis that the existence of 
different tax regimes creates distortions that raise the costs of both MNEs and 
tax authorities, whilst also creating an impediment to the expansion of MNEs to 
new territories, because differences in tax regimes may act as a barrier to entry. 
However, this was not the original problem that called forth the CCCTB. It is a 
different rationale than MNEs engaging in shifting incomes and incorporations 
between territories. It is less about tax avoidance and more about recognizable 
economic benefits of tax compliance with an efficient system. As of July 2016, the 
issue of tax avoidance has been subsumed under a different proposed EC 
directive (EC, 2016c). The proposals in the directive are important but the focus 
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is similarly technical, providing member states with mechanisms to dispute how 
and where income has been reported. Moreover, the framework is still one that 
juxtaposes fairness to efficiency.     
The underlying logic in the way the CCCTB has been positioned is that a 
single simpler common approach to corporation tax creates the basis for the 
spread of investment, employment and economic growth through MNEs. 
However, one must differentiate between economic inefficiency of the textbook 
variety and what is effective based on perceptions of interest in a real economic 
situation. The current system may be inefficient from the point of view of a 
perfect market in which there could be lower transaction costs for all and 
perhaps related transnational growth. However, it is also an effective system in 
terms of enabling tax avoidance. MNEs may still oppose the CCCTB and may still 
seek to subvert it and may do so by lobbying for exemptions and creating new 
kinds of complexity actually increasing their transaction costs. They may decide 
that such higher costs are a necessary concession in order to protect the 
opportunity to avoid tax and so protect profits. 
What the example illustrates is that the CCCTB cannot simply be a set of 
technical conditions expressed in regulation and law. It ought to, for example, 
address global wealth chain (GWC) potentials. That is, appropriately explore 
how wealth is captured and protected rather than merely focus on how more 
wealth might be created (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2017). To be effective it must 
also encourage and help to shape appropriate commitments from MNEs to pay 
fair tax and by states to ensure that tax is paid. The architects of the anti-tax 
avoidance directive and the CCCTB are aware of the issue but the tension 
continues. The cost-benefit analyses, for example, start from the assumption that 
MNEs choose to comply or cooperate. The OECD likewise recognizes this. In its 
Principles of Good Tax Administration it specifically states that voluntary 
compliance is a cornerstone of effective taxation (2001). The CCCTB is important 
because its formal construction takes corporate taxation out of the context of 
separate entities and problems of transfer pricing. It seeks to tax on the basis of 
real economic presence. But the problems of changing the attitude of MNEs to 
paying tax and of states in how they compete with reference to tax remain 
important. These are normative or ethical issues regarding how one behaves. 
Ethics-as-fairness continues to be awkwardly juxtaposed to how economic 
decisions are structured (see Morgan, 2016a).   
 MNEs continue to claim that they follow the law and pay all legally 
required taxes. They also continue to argue that they have a fiduciary duty to 
minimise taxes in order to maximise shareholder value.16 This creates significant 
scope for firms to pay far less than headline rates of corporation tax. It implies a 
duty that shades into justifications for manifestly unethical behaviour. The 
CCCTB changes the context in which behaviour occurs, but there is also a need to 
transform the attitudes that underpin any and all behaviour by the firm in order 
to prevent subversion of the CCCTB once implemented. Economic theory 
traditionally treats evasion, and by extension avoidance, as rational behaviour. It 
is what one would do if not prevented. The CCCTB takes a different position. Tax 
                                                        
16 This is despite that shareholder value is a fictitious commitment in various practical and 
conceptual ways and that the law in many countries formally requires more nuance from the 
firm. For example, the UK Companies Act 2006 requires firms to consider the long-term impact of 
their behaviour on communities.   
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avoidance becomes an economic irrationality that a rational agent will put 
behind them as part of completing the Single Market. Neither concept of 
rationality explicitly places ethics as core to economic decisions, where a 
primitive sense of rationality is replaced by explicit ethical economic reasoning. 
Clearly, the intent is that MNEs do precisely this, but more thought needs to be 
put into how this can be achieved. Recent work on Tax Morale has potential in so 
far as it explores the ‘non-pecuniary’ aspects of behaviour. However, much of it is 
narrowly posed in terms of nudging behaviour to increase taxes paid. There is a 
great deal of scope to address how firms are socialised based on explicit ethical 
obligations, which become integral to how they view their economic and 
business activity. One should not conflate this scope with the widespread failures 
of the discourse of corporate social responsibility. It is broader than this, 
involving an aware citizenry, civil society pressure and social movements 
working cooperatively with experts (such as the Tax Justice Network). The 
socialised firm is not simply about naively asking MNEs to be nice. It is about 
creating a critical context in which it pays to be ethically grounded.  
The EU already has a Platform on Tax Good Governance that helps to 
pursue this agenda. Its success and that of movements like the Tax Justice 
Network hinge on more public awareness and pressure, including pressure to 
introduce the CCCTB. However, the point to emphasise is that for the CCCTB to 
be transformative there must also be transformations in how conduct is 
conceived and rules are followed. This in turn implies that for the CCCTB to be 
effective may require broader transformations in the socio-economic 
framework. Moreover, the tensions have potential significance for the issue of 
the use of tax as a component in competition between states.  
One of the major sources of resistance to the CCCTB from member states 
has been because it may ultimately result in tax harmonization (see also Spengel, 
2007). That is, the imposition of a common tax rate.17 The European Parliament’s 
set of preferred amendments recognizes that the issue needs to be revisited to 
prevent tax competition leading to a race to the bottom (EP, 2012: p. 5). It may 
be the case that an effective CCCTB ultimately requires corporation tax to 
become a non-competitive aspect of economic activity. The EC have been 
unwilling to address this fully. EC documents argue that the existence of the 
CCCTB creates a common base and a single transparent system. Concomitantly, 
within that system the effective tax rates paid in each country are likely to be 
clearer and so there will be greater vigilance, and hence pressure, which it is 
inferred will reduce aggressive tax competition. Moreover, an EU-wide CCCTB 
creates a united front to challenge the activities of ‘non-cooperative’ tax 
jurisdictions and particular MNEs activities beyond the EU. However, nothing 
about these claims prevents a logic of tit-for-tat reductions in tax rates within the 
EU. The EC’s reluctance to go further is clearly strategic. It is a current 
concession to sovereignty arguments in the hope of reducing member state 
opposition. It owes more to political reality within the EU based on economically 
divisive state interests (typified by Ireland’s response in the Apple case) than it 
does long term collective interests or coherent argument.  
 
                                                        
17 As Devereux et al (2008) note, the EU Ruding Committee recommended a 30% minimum rate 
for corporation tax in 1992. This was lower than actual rates in Europe at that time (but clearly 
far higher than is the case today because of tax competition). 
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Conclusion: current prospects for the CCCTB 
 
The European Parliament endorsed the EC CCCTB directive of 2011 in 2012. 
However, this was not without dissent.18 The proposal was then blocked by 
heads of state sitting on the European Council. Many member states remain 
concerned about its implementation. The key concerns focus on sovereignty and 
the right to tax, tax harmonization and then the unintended and transitional 
consequences for individual states that will occur because of a shift to an 
apportionment formula. Ultimately, these arguments do not concern the long-
term collective benefits of unitary taxation. They are nonetheless important.  For 
the CCCTB to become law it must be adopted unanimously by member states. 
The EC remains the main driving force behind the CCCTB. There is no consensus 
amongst EU members via the Council or Parliament regarding the CCCTB 
precisely because of embedded fragmentation. At the same time members 
cannot ignore the problem of tax avoidance nor deny that it is a common and 
collective problem. Each continues to espouse the need for a more effective 
approach and their opposition to ‘aggressive’ avoidance. After a strategic rethink 
the EC released a new Action Plan in mid-2015, and began a consultation on the 
CCCTB. In January 2017, the CCCTB was relaunched within a new two-step 
strategy, beginning first with achieving agreement on the benefits of a common 
tax base and then on a fuller consolidated approach leading to eventual 
legislative agreement for a CCCTB. 19 The Action Plan (EC, 2015) restates the 
issues: avoidance has become easier in a modern context, the current approach 
based on transfer pricing is increasingly anachronistic, and ensuring 
corporations pay ‘fair’ tax is important to legitimacy. The Action Plan and 
relaunch cover five areas but have two key aspects. It endorses the OECD BEPS 
agenda to introduce country-by-country reporting, close loopholes, tighten the 
application of transfer pricing rules, and goes further by suggesting the limits of 
current approaches and the ultimate intention to tax where economic activity 
occurs.20  
                                                        
18 The vote was 452 for, 172 against, and 36 abstentions. The EC is under no obligation to 
incorporate suggested amendments from the EP into a directive. However, under Protocol No 2 
(subsidiarity) of the Lisbon Treaty a national parliament of a member state may submit a written 
‘reasoned opinion’ if a legislative proposal is deemed to interfere in the sovereignty of the 
member state. If 18 of the possible 54 votes held by national parliaments oppose the proposal 
then it must be reviewed. This is termed a ‘yellow card’ (se Gilleard, 2011). The UK, Ireland and a 
collection of relatively new members states have invoked a ‘yellow card’ against the CCCTB. The 
Netherlands, Sweden and Malta have also submitted ‘reasoned opinions’ (comments on the 
consequences of aspects of the CCCTB). Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have 
variously expressed concern regarding the formula and also harmonization. The CCCTB 
apportions based on the scale of activity. This creates potential problems for smaller and more 
volatile economies. Moreover, new members have tended to be sites of relocation of production 
but are, because of scale and income per capita, less significant as points of sale.  As such, the EP 
proposed (Amendment 16) increasing the weighting of employment and tangible assets to 45% 
each and reducing sales to 10% (EP, 2012: p. 8).  The EC rejected this proposal. Ireland 
commissioned Ernst & Young to produce its own assessment of the CCCTB (see Cline et al, 2011).   
19 For example, the documents propose that the CCCTB be made mandatory for MNEs. The 2011 
directive proposes a voluntary system.   
20 As a policy document rather than a piece of analysis the Action Plan puts aside the underlying 
issues that may account for the path-dependent and conservative approach to change typical of 
international initiatives. There is a limited pool of expertise to call on in developing highly 
technical tax regulations. There is significant reliance on people trained by or seconded from the 
 18 
Moreover, one should not neglect that the EU allows for the preliminary 
adoption of some proposed new legislation based on ‘enhanced cooperation’. 
Article 20 in Title IV of the Treaty on the European Union and Articles 326-334 
in Title III of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union set out the 
terms of enhanced cooperation (FCO, 2008: 16-17 and 187-190).21 A minimum 
of nine participating members is required to create a functioning unit for some 
prescribed institutional-policy purpose, such as the implementation of the 
proposed CCCTB directive. Amendment 6 of the European Parliamentary 
response to the 2011 EC directive includes a specific recognition that the CCCTB 
could proceed without unanimity between member states (EP, 2012: p. 3).  
As the Action Plan and relaunch state: the EU creates unique scope to 
introduce unitary taxation that may then spread. The EU is a source of regional 
legislation that can create a united front. It provides an important platform for 
something transformational that should not be rejected through conflation with 
the problem of democratic deficits in EU institutions. The CCCTB seems to be an 
example of where that deficit has, at least to some degree, provided an 
opportunity to address one of the major abuses of our time. However, as the 
2015 document also states: ‘Ultimately, the key to reforming corporate taxation 
in the EU [and across the world], to make it fairer and more efficient, is in the 
hands of member states. Member states need to overcome their differences for 
the sake of fairness…’ (EC, 2015).  
Ultimately, the CCCTB has context in terms of problems of government 
and governance. Corporate tax avoidance is a legitimacy issue for both states and 
the EU. If reform allows states to continue to pursue tax competition and MNEs 
are able to engage in arbitrage then tax policy will contribute to contemporary 
problems of cynicism and of populism. Brexit, the election of Trump and 
problems in the EU has many causes but a common sentiment: a deep sense that 
systems and practices favour the few over the many. The CCCTB offers 
something potentially transformative. The CCCTB is also important because one 
increasingly hears that collecting corporation tax has become too difficult and 
that it should be scrapped. This could easily be counter-productive. Tax is a 
signal and symbol that speaks to the nature of society. Tax issues may seem 
technical and so easily neglected on the basis that there are more important 
matters to be concerned with at the moment. However, to address tax is to 
address an underlying cause rather than to focus on consequences and 
symptoms. There is something symbiotic here: public awareness and pressure 
increase the likelihood that tax policy can be transformative, and that awareness 
and pressure internalise changes within society that both increase the potential 
efficacy of initiatives like the CCCTB and enhance the legitimacy of the society in 




                                                                                                                                                              
Big 4, creating issues of human capital bias (this is what we know and this is where our skills 
are), group think, capture and conflict of interest. Around £25 billion of the Big 4’s combined 
annual turnover of approximately £75 billion derives from tax advice.      
21 The Treaty on the European Union is the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union is the renamed 1958 Treaty of Rome, both amended as part 
of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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